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Governing for Genuine Profit
Michael J. O'Hara*

ABSTRACT

Business corporations can have many purposes. The
shareholder wealth maximization goal is the proper one for
business. This maximization, however, must look to the longterm as well as the short-term. Terrorism is a major threat to
the long-term stability, profitability, and even viability of
business corporations. Because of a focus on the short-term to
the exclusion of the long-term, businesses are likely to shirk
their responsibilities related to terrorism and its causes. A
paradigm-shift is necessary to bring business to accept their
responsibilitiesand internalizetheir costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION

What is the purpose of a business corporation? Because there
are many forms of business, that question can have many answers. It
is axiomatic in law and economics that a for-profit business exists to
maximize profit. For publicly traded firms, profit maximization is
rephrased as maximizing shareholder wealth because the discounted
J.D.; Ph.D.; Finance, Banking, & Law Department, College
of Business
Administration, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
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present value of all future profit streams equals current shareholder
wealth.
Narrowly defined, the goal of shareholder wealth maximization
can generate business decisions that are fundamentally flawed. Both
critics and corporate mangers lament that corporate governance
today is too focused on the next fiscal quarter rather than the long
run. 1 An "efficient" market, when populated by day traders who own
shares at neither the start of the day nor at the end of day, further
2
compounds the tendency for myopic management.
This Article will not challenge the shareholder wealth
maximization goal. Instead, this Article will insist on it. All too
often, the shareholder wealth maximization goal is praised in name
and ignored in practice. The decisions of business corporations are
decisions requiring tradeoffs. All tradeoffs are complex and tinged
with uncertainty. Accordingly, the scope of governance discretion
must be broad. In practice, rather than in theory, all too often the
shareholder wealth maximization goal is ignored. Agents of the
principal too narrowly define value streams (when it suits the agent's
preference), and both agents and the market misapply discounting to
present values.
More fully defining the net that is the business' profit and
accurately applying the concept of discounted present value will
orient a firm towards sustainability. That sustainable orientation
fosters peace.

II.

SEEKING PROFIT

Business corporations are legal persons. 3 Business corporations
exist because society wishes to encourage business investment.
Society encourages shareholders to place their wealth at risk. The
4
encouragement society offers is liability limited to that investment.

1.
See, e.g., Joseph McCafferty, Cease the Day Trader, CFO: THE MAG. FOR
SENIOR FIN. EXECUTIVES, Aug. 1, 1999, at 13 (discussing a small-cap corporation's
frustration with, and efforts to thwart, day trader's demands for short-term increases
in the price of corporate stock). See also Natalia Williams, Day Traders Watch Tiny
Ups and Downs Shootings 'Nothing to Do with Day-Trading, TORONTO STAR, July 30,
1999, News Section ("A trader might buy hundreds of shares of stocks, worth
thousands of dollars, then sell them minutes later as the stock rises or falls, hoping to
make a quick profit."); Phillip Coggan et al., Coca-ColaSnubs Myopia of Wall St., FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at 12.
2.
See, e.g., McCafferty, supranote 1, at 13.
3.

CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,

CORPORATIONS AND

OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 155 (3d ed. 1999) ("[I]n most respects a corporation will
be granted the same legal rights and responsibilities as would any person."). See also
Miles v. Dep't of Treasury, 199 N.E. 372, 374 (Ind. 1935) ("Corporations are treated as
persons domiciled within the state."); Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May Concern:
Fiduciary Duties and Business Associations, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 523 (2001) ('The
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Each natural person can tolerate only so much risk. Limited
liability allows each investor to place at risk only that fraction of the
investor's wealth that can be tolerated. 5 Limited liability allows
additional natural persons to invest and increases the total pool of
wealth available for business formation. Business corporations exist
to serve society and society bears the cost of limited liability.
Corporations that foster sustainable peace serve society well, and
those that defeat peace do not.
The corporation's Board of Directors and the Officers are
fiduciaries. 6 They are economic agents for a principal. Their primary
fiduciary duty is to husband their shareholders' investment. 7 The
fiduciary duty is to pursue shareholder wealth maximization. The
maximization to be pursued is long-run, not short-run, shareholder
wealth maximization.8
Business corporations seek profit, which is total revenue minus
total cost. That is, after subtracting cost, they maximize net revenue.
More narrowly defined, the corporation maximizes net revenues that
are internal to the corporation. Accounting tracks transactional
values that go through the corporation. 9 Corporations tend to ignore

archetypical legal person is, of course, the corporation.").
4.
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 157 (the concept of limited
liability "allows a shareholder to risk only a predetermined amount of capital in each
...investment, instead of potentially risking her entire wealth"). See also DENNIS W.
CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13-14 (2000)
(stating that limited liability means that "stockholders need not pay [a corporation for
which they own stock's] debt with their own assets").
5.
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 157.
6.
Id. at 259 ("[O1fficers and other corporate agents are subject to fiduciary
duties.").
7.
Though for the purposes of this discussion, this is to be assumed, there is
disagreement in the literature as to whether this is a truism. Compare O'KELLEY &
THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 260 ("[Dlirectors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation,
not to individual shareholders."), with NIGEL GRAHAM MAW ET AL., MAW ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 4 (1994) (stating that the directors owe, individually and collectively,
duties to the shareholders), and DENNIS C. MUELLER, THE MODERN CORPORATION:
PROFITS, POWER, GROWTH AND PERFORMANCE 86-87 (1986) (discussing relative merits
of an approach where directors maximize stockholder value and other approaches).
8.
For the purposes of this discussion, this is assumed to be what directors
should do: commentators disagree generally about what motivates corporate directors'
actions. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1162-73 (1984) (discussing whether parties motivated to take over other
corporations are seeking to provide better management for the corporation, allow for
synergies between their current corporation and their prospective prey, or to pursue
somewhat irrational growth strategies); MUELLER, supra note 7, at 44-46 (discussing
different theories of motivation posited by economists for directors and bureaucrats).
9.
CHARLES H. MEYER, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR LAWYERS IN A
NUTSHELL 1 (1995) ("Financial accounting involves the process of recording
transactions in the accounting records of a business and periodically [processing them]
to produce a [corporation's] set of financial statements.").
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values that are not internalized by the corporation.1 0
Values not internalized by the market system are known as
externalities or spillovers. 11
All market transactions involve
spillovers of varying magnitudes and durability. A market failure is
said to exist when a spillover's magnitude becomes so large, durable,
or predictable that the spillover materially distorts the market's
efficiency. 12
For example, education is subsidized because of
substantial spillover benefits and pollution is regulated because of
substantial spillover costs. 13 The very existence of the firm is a
tribute to market failures. The firm exists because the firm is able to
assemble the transactions more efficiently than the market by
14
internalizing otherwise external values.
Profit is a net, but net of what?
Governing boards and
management must choose which spillovers (both costs and benefits) to
internalize.
They must make trade-offs.
A creative executive
compensation package is a bundle of values, both internal and
external to the firm. 15 The governing board should be no less creative
in pursuing sustainable peace.

10.
This results from the financial status of corporations being judged almost solely
by an examination of their financial statements. Cf. STANLEY SIEGEL & DANIEL A. SIEGEL,
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 3-4 (1983) ("Investors and creditors use [financial
statements] to determine whether, and to what extent, to extend credit or refuse it, to invest
or disinvest.'). This phenomenon is in part caused by "bounded" rationality. "Bounded"
rationality results from "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving
complex problems [being] very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution
is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 36 (1996) (quoting HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198
(1957)). Because investors only have a finite amount of time to process whether or not to
make a particular decision, they have to use these financial statements as a proxy for a
fuller, more personal understanding of the corporation's total value. See SIEGEL & SIEGEL,
supra, at 4.
11.
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 4, at 82 ("An externality occurs when
consumers or firms do not bear the full cost (benefit) from the harm (good) their actions
do to others.").
12.
Id. ("[D]istortions, or inefficiencies in production due to improper pricing
[relative to social costs or benefits], are referred to as market failures.") (emphasis
omitted).
13.
See id. (regarding pollution). See also ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L.
RuBENFELD, MICROECONOMICS 678-80 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing education).

14.
Economists state that because of transaction costs and strategic behavior,
situational sub-optimalities can result from parties not having a perceived harmony of
interest. See generally PINDYCK & RUBENFELD, supra note 13, at 665-69. See also
generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386 (1937); DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD, IN COASE'S FOOTSTEPS (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 175, 2003),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com.
15.
See MUELLER, supra note 7, at 44 (discussing a number of conflicting
motivations of directors that have to be both balanced and tamed by their firms).
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III.

BIASES OF BUSINESS

Business is biased towards revenue.
Often, this bias is
appropriate because a sustainable firm must capture value.
16
Capturing cost tends to be far easier than capturing revenue.
However, the true goal is wealth, not revenue.
Business is biased against cost. This anti-cost bias is greatest
against internal costs. In fact, external costs are too often ignored or,
worse, are the deliberate consequence of governance. A firm can
create the false appearance of increasing profit by externalizing
costs. 17 Society, however, sees no profit. Such false profits defeat
society's expectations when creating corporations.
Business corporations have another bias: Today is preferred
over tomorrow. Managers of risk soon learn that the future is
unpredictable and that a bird in the hand is worth more than one in
the bush. The precise value of "now" is calculated using discounted
present value. 18
However, all too often, business distorts that
calculation and, in effect, eats its seed corn.
Business focuses upon cash profit in the form of net revenue.
That is, business focuses on out-of-pocket total revenue minus out-ofpocket total cost. This cash profit is only one measure of value and
wealth. Cash profit fails to account for spillover costs and spillover
benefits. Governing boards should govern with an eye on these
spillovers, so the board can select the best set of trade-offs for
maximization of the shareholders' wealth.

16.
In order to fully maximize revenues, firms would have to charge each
customer the maximum price that they would pay for a particular good. PINDYCK &
RUBENFELD, supra note 13, at 377. States have worked to prevent such "price
discrimination." See Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2002) (making
most forms of price discrimination, or price difference, between purchasers of goods of
like grade and quality illegal under Federal law). Conversely, states are relatively
effective, through forcing firms to pay for externalities which they force upon society.
See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
17.
There are a multitude of ways through which to disguise problems in
revenues and liquidity of a firm though they are often perceptible to a close reader of a
firm's balance sheet. See generally Sally L. Hoffman, GAAP and the Basic Financial
Statements, in ACCOUNTING & FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 7 (Sally L. Hoffman & Michael
Elliot-Jones eds., 1997).
18.
Discounted present value is determined by the rate of return and the
length of time the money is invested. PINDYCK & RUBENFELD, supra note 13, at 547-48.
The discounted present value of $1 paid after n years = ($1 / (1 + R)n), where R = the
interest rate and n = the number of years invested. Id. at 548.

770

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36..765

Markets transactions are transactions between participants who
are both willing and able to participate in a particular transaction. 19
If a participant is either unwilling (e.g., theft) or is unable (e.g., poor)
to participate, then the market neither sees nor registers that
transaction. 20 Such involuntary transactions generate spillovers or
externalities. 21 Cash profits based on substantial spillovers are false
22
profits.
23
At its essence, board oversight is prioritization in the long run.
Prioritization is choosing between options. This choosing requires the
acceptance of trade offs. The realm of management is similar in that
management also prioritizes and accepts trade-offs. However, the
realm of management is the short-term while the realm of the board
is the long-term.
The business bias against tomorrow is greatest in management.
The board's governance should counteract this management bias. As
certainty diminishes, the role of the board increases. Certainty is
diminished by externalities that are difficult to quantify. Also, the
magnitude of spillovers often is greatest in the future-the realm of
board governance. Spillovers, especially when coupled with clumsy
applications of discounted present value, can create a false perception
of profit. 24 Accordingly, cash profit can be a gross misstatement of
the firm's value generation. Because the board's governance duty is
to maximize shareholder wealth, governance includes choosing which
external values to internalize.

19.
Id. at 20 (discussing basics of supply and demand).
20.
Id.
21.
Any shift in a demand curve away from the social optimum, if caused by an
inefficiency, results in a "deadweight loss" to society as a whole.
See generally
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 4, at 72. The exact valuation of the deadweight loss
can be expressed in terms of the elasticities of supply and demand, and the size of the
total involved market. Id. at 73 n.10.
22.
That is, assuming that one was trying to factor in externalities and to
prevent losses to the whole of society. See supra notes 9, 11-14, 21 and accompanying
text.
23.
See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(discussing corporate director's role of providing judgment and prioritization for the
corporation). Changes accompanying the development of the modern corporation, by
"clearly remov[ing] the executives responsible for the destiny of the entire enterprise
from routine operational activities . . . gave them the time, information, and even
psychological commitment for long-term planning and appraisal." WILLIAMSON, supra
note 10, at 82 (quoting ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 382-83

(1962)).
24.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (regarding externalities or
spillovers); supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the economic concept of
discounted present value).

2003]

GOVERNING FOR GENUINE PROFIT

IV. VALUE OF A DOLLAR TODAY

A dollar tomorrow is worth less than a dollar today. For
example, when is $1,000,000 tomorrow only worth $1 today? 25 At a
20 percent interest rate $1,000,000 in 70 years is worth but $1 today;
at 10 percent, it's 140 years; at 5 percent, it's 280 years.
The required rate of return reflects a variety of risks, including
inflation and business failure. 26 Venture capitalists face some of the
greatest risks and routinely strive for a rate of return equaling 100%.
In effect, $1,000,000 a mere 14 years in the future is only worth $1
today. In stark contrast, the Iroquois 27 recommended management

The text will use rounded numbers. A quick calculation is based on the
25.
Rule of 70 and a rounded doubling. The Rule of 70 is an approximation of how many
time periods are required to double (if earning interest) or to halve (if paying interest) a
dollar value over time. In the Rule of 70, the number 70 is divided by the interest rate
stated as an integer. For example, assume annual interest of 7% per year, then 70
divided by 7 yields 10 periods needed to halve or double a value. Next, note that if $-1
is doubled successively 20 times the result is $1,048,576. Accordingly, the Rule of 70
and 20 doublings indicates that at 7% interest earned, $1 now is worth approximately
$1,000,000 in 200 years.
The Rule of 70 is an approximation. The accuracy of the approximation depends on
the level of the interest rate. The fields of biology and economics, which tend to focus
on growth rates in the range between 3% and 5%, tend to use the Rule of 70. In
contrast, the field of finance, which tends to focus on rate in the range between 6% and
8%, tend to use the Rule of 72. See generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 4. See
also Inv. FAQ, Analysis - Rule of 72 (Feb. 18, 1998), at http://investfaq.com/articles/analy-rule-72.html.
A firm's rate of return is usually defined as a ratio of its profit (revenue
26.
minus operating cost, including capital depreciation), iT, to the value of the capital
stock, pkK,
ROR = [pQ - wL - uK]/ pkK, where w is the wage the firm pays to hire
one unit of labor, u is the user cost of capital (the cost of using or
renting the capital for one period), pk is the purchase price of one unit of
capital stock.
Id. at 671. See also 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6679.40 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (noting that
one way of handling inflation is to adjust the rate of return to match rates available for
similar investments.)
27.
The Iroquois are a confederation of six Native American nations (not a "tribe').
The six are Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas, and Tuscaroras. In the
American Revolution, the confederacy split. Some supported the patriots, and others
supported the British. They never really had an "empire" in the European sense of occupied
territory. They had network of alliances. The U.S. system of government draws some
inspiration from the Iroquois system. See generally DONALD A. GRINDE, JR. & BRUCE E.
JOHANSEN, ExEMPLAR OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY
(1991). See also World History Newsletter, New York (Nov. 12, 2002), at
http://www.worldhistory.com/newsletter17_newyork.htm.
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decisions that would serve well the seventh generation. 28 Assuming,
as Thomas Jefferson did, 29 that a generation is 19 years, then the
Iroquois recommend management decisions that valued $1,000,000 in
133 years as worth $1 today (almost 7 percent). If one recognizes
that, in the industrialized world of the 21st century, a generation may
now be more like 30 years, then managing for the seventh generation
would require a focus of 210 years (or about a 11 percent rate of
return).
The key question is: "Will that $1 be dedicated today for
tomorrow's use?" If that $1 is not dedicated today, then tomorrow
most likely will be hard pressed to pay the piper.

V. OLD AND NEW: RISKS AND MANAGEMENT

Today, businesses are buffeted by the old risks of recession and
the new risks of terrorism. These demands on business reduce the
likelihood business will fund the needs of the future created by the
decisions of today. The typical management of old risks focuses on
minimizing costs located internally, in part at the cost of ignoring the
magnitude of costs located externally. 30 This does not bode well for
the future. New management of new risks needs to strive to avoid
the tragedy of the commons as well as seek out more synchronicities.
The tragedy of the commons is an unintentional overconsumption of a shared resource.3 1 The tragedy of the commons
results when many individual users each consume at an individual
level that is far less than the sustainable level for the shared
resource; however, the aggregation of these many individual uses
exceeds the sustainable level.3 2 In the tragedy of the commons, the
shared resource degrades and ultimately is destroyed.

28.
The Iroquois believe that all important decisions (not just management)
should be made with the seventh generation in mind. This is a way of saying that
planning should be done in the interests of generations yet unborn, e.g., long-range.
See generally BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, SI-LYPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE ON NATIVE
AMERICANS:
LAND, SPIRIT, AND POWER (2000) (discussing a profile of Iroquois

faithkeeper Oren Lyons).
29.

HERBERT E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST 52 (1995).

30.
"Because the maximization of wealth is the primordial economic incentive
of the corporate body, it will have compelling incentives to externalize the full costs of
production." Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as
Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect
Competition,46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 18 (1989) (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968)).
31.

See generally DAVID P. BARASH & CHARLES P. WEBEL, PEACE AND CONFLICT

STUDIES 463-64 (2002).
32.

Id.
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Peace reduces business risk and increases profit. 33 Thus, for
business, peace is a shared resource. If business does not protect this
shared resource, then the tragedy of the commons is the likely result.
It is profitable for business to foster peace.
Synchronicity is the essence of business. Profit is a surplus
extracted from transactions embedded in multiple, interrelated
processes. Timing is critical to profit. The reason the firm exists is
34
the firm better synchronizes some transactions than the market.
Timing also is critical to peace. Business needs to foster peace as one
of the multiple, interrelated processes that generate the profit upon
which businesses live.
Business management and board governance need to seek out,
and prosper, via synchronicity. Management and governance focus
on different processes and different synchronicities. Governance has
more of an eye on the distant future, thus governance must anticipate
more. 35 Governance fails when governance mimics the myopic focus
of management. Governance needs a greater anticipation, especially
Not all
focused on a search for externalities to internalize.
externalities should be internalized as part of governance's
synchronicity. 36 The firm has a small span of control compared with
At its core, however, governance will find
the invisible hand.
synchronicity means that it is profitable for one to be one's brother's
37
keeper.
How can increasing internal costs be profitable? That is easy to
answer. The alternative is far more costly. 38 If modern society is to
survive, then the seeds of terrorism and their fruit of tremendous loss
must be contained.

33.
Id. at 41 (explaining that military spending has high economic costs.
Although military spending does create jobs, comparable spending in the civilian
economy creates even more jobs while often addressing critical social needs).
"To minimize the cost of transaction failures, business organizations have
34.
developed institutional arrangements, which involve a reduction in reliance on the
market, to organize production to solve the opportunistic problems associated with
market transactions." Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints on
Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory,
Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1028
(1983) (discussing the advantages of vertical corporate structures over pure market
transactions).
35.
A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?: The Berle-Dodd
Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 53 (1991).
"The objective is still generally shareholder wealth maximization, but
36.
tempered by an objective of good corporate citizenship." Janis Sarra, Corporate
Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadianand InternationalDevelopments, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1691, 1709 (2002) (discussing communitarian theory and corporate
decision-making).
Id. at 1709-11.
37.
38.
Id. at 1709-12.
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VI. RISK CAN NOT BE ZERO
Risk can not be zero. This is well understood by managers and
boards alike. Also well understood is that the firm can not be all
39
things to all people; the firm must focus on its core competencies.
Risk-in the context of terrorism-threatens the very existence of the
firm, especially its long-term existence.
Governance duties
necessarily include addressing such a large risk beyond the time
focus of management.
Because risk can not be eliminated, containment is the
maximum feasible success. 40 Unfortunately, from the perspective of
business success, contained terrorism might be an utter failure. The
maximum feasible consequences of terrorism can extinguish the
current world order of global capitalism. Many international firms
would be forced to shatter and disintegrate if world markets did not
exist. 4 ' As in the case of any organism deprived of its habitat,
extinction would soon follow.
Each organism has a limited ability both to bear and to spread
losses. A firm or a market can tolerate a one-time loss of some
limited magnitude.4 2 Beyond that limit, the firm can not bend, it
breaks. Also, just because the firm can absorb the one-time loss, that
alone does not mean the firm can survive. In addition to absorbing
the one-time loss, the firm must be able to spread the cost across its
customer base without making its products too expensive for the
customer base.4 3 It is true that global firms are more resilient than
Mom-and-Pop stores, but each has its limits. The maximum feasible
consequences of terrorism can exceed even a global firm's ability to
bear and spread losses.
The risk that terrorism presents to society and to business is
great and is shared. Because the risk of terrorism is great, because it
is shared, because it lurks in the future beyond the realm of

39.
See generally id.
40.
'The goal should be to minimize the effects of terrorism, since it can never
be completely eliminated."
William H. Boger, International Cooperation in the
Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 80 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 386, 404
(1986).
41.
Joseph J. Norton, "InternationalFinance Law," An Increasingly Important
Component of "InternationalEconomic Law A Tribute to Professor John H. Jackson,
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 133, 144 (1999) (discussing the importance of stable financial
structures in emerging markets).
42.
Joseph L. Motes, III, A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of Derivative
Instruments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579, 603-04 (1996) (discussing the potential for
international market instability or collapse upon the failure or withdrawal of a single
major market participant).
43.
Daniel A. Barfield, Better to Give Than to Receive: Should Non-Profit
Corporations and Charities Pay Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1193, 1216
n.128 (1995) (discussing the ability and limitations of corporations to pass one-time
expenses, such as large punitive damage judgments, to consumers).
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management and in the realm of governance, there is an increase in
the risk of the tragedy of the commons. The probability that business
will shirk responsibility is greater. Firms, their boards, and their
managers are likely to claim it is not their duty and it is not
profitable for them to be their brother's keepers. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.

VII. SEEDS AND FRUIT

The seeds of terrorism are in our human condition. Terrorism as
44
a military and as a political tool is fostered by a few conditions.
Terrorism is an attractive military and political tool because it is
highly leveraged. 4 5 Businesses can appreciate the magnification of
market presence and force via leveraging. Leveraging empowers a
46
terrorist to use relatively few resources to cause great losses.
Terrorism is attractive when there is a minimal price of life, in the
eyes of the terrorist, both for the terrorist and the enemy. 4 7 Life
appears less valuable when global capitalism spawns grinding
poverty juxtaposed with abundance, when illiteracy and oppression
are the norm, and especially when ideological intensity (e.g.,
perversion of religion) washes over the suffering masses. 48 These
conditions are fertile for the seeds of terrorism. Add to this volatile
mixture the chronic temptation of humans to listen to the lesser
angels of our nature, and business should expect sustained losses
attributable to terrorism. The seeds of terrorism will bear the bitter
49
fruit of substantial losses in place of hoped for profits.

44.

CINDY C. COMBS, TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8 (1997)

(defining terrorism as "a synthesis of war and theater, a dramatization of the most
proscribed kind of violence-that which is perpetuated on innocent victims-played
before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes").
45.
George F. Will, When a Nation's Virtues Draw the Anger of the Weak,
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at Al.
46.
Id.
47.
See COMBS, supra note 44, at 9 (providing that more people die in car
accidents every year in the United States than as a result of acts of terrorism). See
Martha Crenshaw, How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to
UnderstandingTerrorism, in TERRORISM: ROOTS, IMPACT, RESPONSES 70, 73 (Lawrence
Howard ed., 1992) (noting that terrorism is economical because it requires little in the
way of manpower).
48.
Lawrence Howard, Introduction, in TERRORISM: ROOTS, IMPACT,
RESPONSES, supra note 47, at 1, 7 (citing as causes of terrorism the presence of
unresolved political conflicts and the growing economic hopelessness and political
frustration of vast numbers of people, particularly in third-world countries).
49.
B.S. Raghaven, Costs of Terror, HINDU BUS. LINE (July 22, 2002), available
at http://blonnet.com.
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The fruits of tremendous loss, primarily, are "technological." By
technological, it is meant the losses primarily alter the feasible
combination of inputs. 50 The losses of terrorism, primarily, are not
the assets lost, but rather are the losses in subsequent output. 51 The
losses can be minor or major.
Minor losses would include specific physical assets and (as crass
as it may sound) specific human casualties. 52 The loss of any specific
53
asset is minor, regardless of how many specific assets are lost.
These losses do not become major merely when many buildings are
destroyed or when many people are killed. As humbling as it may be,
individual assets and individual humans rarely are critical to total
output.
Losses become major when the losses exceed the firm's, the
market's, or the society's ability to bear or to spread the loss. 54 Major
losses exist when there are network effects or adverse shifts in the
55
social psychological paradigms.
Often it is said that the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts. This is an example of a network effect. Synchronicity
generates the network effect. A well-targeted attack generates a
negative network effect because a well-targeted attack is leveraged.
A well-targeted attack removes a critical input and thus reduces the
usefulness of many other inputs. 56 Without electricity, how useful is
a computer? Without a surgeon, how useful is an operating room?

50.

Id.

51.
See, e.g., Sam Zuckerman, Crisis of Confidence; Individual Actions Could
Determine Whether the Economy Strengthens or Weakens, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 16,
2001, at El (as attention shifts from day to day activity and focuses more on news
centered on terrorism, output wanes).
52.
Eleanor Wainstein & Susanna W. Purnell, Effects of Terrorism on Business
Operations,in MANAGING TERRORISM 125 (Patrick J. Montana & George S. Roukis eds.,
1983).
The difference in definitions between minor loss and major loss is rather
53.
slight; minor losses could, in fact, constitute a major loss, if, in the aggregate, the loss
led to conditions defining the major loss. See generally Wainstein & Purnell, supra
note 52.
Assume for argument that when losses become too large for the firm to
54.
absorb or to spread, the losses are defined as major. Thus, when minor losses become
too large for a firm to bear or spread, the losses become major losses. See id. at 125.
See Zuckerman, supra note 51.
55.
56.
This must be so, by definition, of a critical input; any input critical to
production, once removed, effectively cripples production, rendering all other inputs
less useful. James R. Ratner, Should There Be An Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 327, 345-46 (1988) (discussing what constitutes an essential input and
its effect upon the firm). See also generally SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (James Clavell
ed., 1983).
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Network effects can be restored via substitution of inputs if the
humans are willing to work. 5 7 Accordingly, an adverse shift in social
psychological paradigms is a far greater loss than harm to network
effects. 58
The social matrix is necessary for any asset to be
productive. If the social matrix collapses, then all assets produce
59
less.
Humans innately fear the unknown. If terrorism can generate
mass uncertainty, then terrorism can extinguish trust. Without
trust, the social matrix collapses and firms can not earn a profit
because their own workers will avoid the firm and the market will be
empty. 60 If terrorists can replace optimism with fatalism, or if
terrorists can replace trust with fear, then a major loss is suffered.

VIII. PARADIGM OF GENUINE

PROFIT

Businesses face new risks to the firm and to the market. These
risks are indigenous to the very social fabric within which business
acts. If these risks are not managed, then the existence of the market
that sustains the firm and the firm itself are in question.
Management of these risks is far from a trivial matter. This
management task exceeds the resources and influence of any one
government, any collection of governments, or collection of nongovernmental organizations.
Businesses must contribute to the
management of these new risks.
For managing these risks,
businesses often are better equipped than most, if not all,
governments
and
non-governmental
organizations,
with
advantageous social engagement with the local milieu, resources on
site, and market intelligence.
Accordingly, governing boards must propel businesses towards a
paradigm of genuine profit. The days of a myopic focus on cash profit
are over. It is a governance duty of a corporate board to take
ownership of the project to create the shift towards a paradigm of
genuine profit. 61 The focus of management, appropriately, is on the

57.

WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS 162 (7th ed. 1998).

The authors note that in the event of loss of a given input, substitution of one input for
another can be achieved by an increase in the substituting input-here, labor.
58.
Phillip A. Karber & R. William Mengel, Political and Economic Forces
Affecting Terrorism, in MANAGING TERRORISM, supra note 52, at 35.
59.
Wainstein & Purnell, supra note 52, at 126-27, 129-30 (describing a
situation wherein personnel replacements are made in response to terrorist threats,
requiring on-the-job training resulting in a temporary loss of productivity, as well as
technical support and maintenance lags also resulting in loss of productivity).
60.
See id. at 129-30.
61.
See MUELLER, supra note 7, at 44-46; see also FRANCIS A. GEVURTZ,
CORPORATION LAW 273-78 (2000); MAW ET AL., supra note 7, at 4, 10-15 (discussing the
positive duties of corporate directors).
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planning and actions
short-run. Genuine profit requires long-run
62
that are not in the realm of management.
The shift to a paradigm of genuine profit is needed, but may be
irrelevant. A paradigm shift that is too small, too infrequent, or too
late will not manage the risks of terrorism. 63 The scale, scope, and
timing of this paradigm shift must be sufficient to alter experiences
and expectations on the ground.64 Anything less will leave so many
seeds of terrorism that the likely harvest will exceed businesses'
ability to bear and spread the losses.
Is it foolhardy to expect a sufficient shift towards genuine profit?
No. The conference hosted by the William Davidson Institute offers
hope. That conference helps belie predictions that the speed of
diffusion of terrorist technology will render irrelevant the
transformation of corporate governance. We can reasonably hope for
a better world when change agents are alert and in motion.
The governing boards, however, must do the heavy lifting.
Governing boards must insist that their firms prospect for positive
feedback loops and implement a sustainable profit stream. This is
not a radical proposal, because it is the stuff of business to generate
All business
surplus from well-managed synchronicities. 65
opportunities require prospecting. What must be avoided is a false
sense of success from merely grabbing low hanging fruit versus
Patient and thoughtful
planting and tending the vineyard. 66
husbandry by governing boards will be needed.
Governing boards must challenge their management teams to
search for feedback loops that reinforce and foster peace in addition to
capturing cash profit. Every feedback loop is an expansive source of
causality. 67 The resonance of causality can be positive or negative in

62.
See McCafferty, supra note 1, at 13; MUELLER, supranote 7, at 44-46.
63.
See Joseph A. Malley, Preparing and Protecting Property and Personnel
Prior to a Terrorist Attack, in MANAGING TERRORISM, supra note 52, at 73-90 ('The
main objective of this . . . program is to . . . prevent or deter acts of aggression ...

reduce losses ... when an incident occurs, and expedite return to normalcy or recovery
following a terrorist attack.").
Id. See also Wainstein & Purnell, supra note 52, at 128-33 (discussing the
64.
effects of terrorism on employees).
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 4, at 11-13 (discussing the purpose of
65.
firms).
66.
See Lawrence Lindsey, 28 Bus. ECON. 15, 18 (1993) (essentially advocating
patience to see results).
67.
Feedback loops, by definition, modify the processes of which they are a
part; thus, they must be a significant source of causality, producing varied effects in
their parent production systems. James B. Zimarowski et al., An Institutional
Perspective on Law and Economics (Chicago Style) in the Context of United States
Labor Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 435 (1993) (discussing positive and negative feedback
loops).
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consequence. 6 8 Positive feedback loops, such as those that nurture
freedom, offer synchronicities with the core competency of businessgenerating profit by serving the will of the consumers. 69 Likewise,
negative feedback loops, such as those that nurture terrorism, need to
70
be dampened or the future of business will be bleak.
A corporate focus on genuine profit fosters positive feedback
loops and dampens negative feedback loops. 71 A shortsighted pursuit
of an episodic profit stream often is falsely profitable. 72
The
shortsighted pursuit of an up-front and non-sustainable profit stream
is, however, consistent with the biases of business towards revenue,
away from cost, and for today over tomorrow. 73 Mere extraction from
a market depletes the market and wastes valuable relationship assets
established by the corporation. 74 In contrast, sustainable profit
streams are genuinely profitable. A corporate engagement that sees
and captures a multitude of value streams-not merely the cash
profit value stream-fosters positive feedback loops with the local
market and builds sustainable profit streams. 75 The profitability of
the firm increases and, at the same time, peace is reinforced and
enhanced by sustainability.

IX.

RECOMMENDATION

In short, governing boards must insist that their firm be
entrepreneurial. All entrepreneurs engage in risk management as
their primary task. When managing risk, an entrepreneur fails to act
ethically if focused solely on legal liability, especially when a
corporation's owners are shielded from legal liability by limited

68.

See DAVID P. BARASH & CHARLES P. WEBEL, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

82, 427-28 (2002)
69.
See id.
70.
Id. at 263-65 (quoting St. Augustine, "War is waged so that peace may
prevail ....
But it is a greater glory to slay war with a word than people with a sword,
and to gain peace by means of peace and not by means of war.").
71.
Dana Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of
Discrimination,86 VA. L. REV. 727, 732-33 (2000) (discussing the link between positive
feedback loops and corporate market dominance).
72.
See Joseph Klesney, The Moral Trappings of the Short Term Fix (May 10,
2001), at http://www.acton.org ("The impulse to target the short term in response to
both gainful and disappointing events in the market can cause headaches for managers
in the long run. Expediency is not always the best policy.").
73.
Id.
74.
See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 4, at 78-79 (discussing market exit).
75.
IRA M. MILLSTEIN ET AL.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
IMPROVING
COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETS 72 (1998) (advocating

the use of long-run value streams, including research investment, employee training,
and consideration of public perception of a corporation and societal benefits, and
warning against under estimating the value of such streams).
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liability. Governing boards should more fully define their firms'
responsibility.
Legal and ethical risk management call for intelligence of design
and operation. That intelligence is partly measured by the quantity
and quality of the outputs relative to the firm's inputs as well as the
firm's cherished values. A firm that internalizes externalities based
on manageable synchronicities, and thus reaps a sustainable profit
stream, manifests such intelligence of design and operation. Such a
firm also maximizes shareholder wealth. If governing boards do
otherwise, and continue to maximize shareholder wealth based on the
knowledge of the price of everything and the value of nothing, then
we will all share in the tragedy of our common loss of first, peace, and
second, our entire way of life.

